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What's behind the hints towards better U.S. ties with Indonesia? Lecturers at Deakins University in Australia, Dr.
Damien Kingsbury, a co-editor of 'Reformasi': Crisis and Change in Indonesia, and Scott Burchill who teaches
international relations, discuss the issue.
GEELONG, Victoria (JP): Following the visit by U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld, security issues in the region are starting to look much clearer. A widespread belief that Indonesia is
edging towards disintegration should now be laid to rest.
It has become a truism of secessionism that, to be successful, it often requires the support of an active external
sponsor. Some examples of successful secessionism, or fragmentation, include Panama from Columbia (supported
by the United States), Bangladesh from Pakistan (India), the Soviet satellites and states, and Yugoslavia (U.S. and
NATO) and East Timor (Portugal and the United Nations).
Indonesia has numerous trouble spots but only two, Aceh and West Papua, officially Irian Jaya, have the clear goal
of secession. Dissent in Riau, near Singapore, is largely rhetorical and the recreation of Republic of South Maluku in
Ambon is a faint echo of the secession movement of 1950 amplified by communal conflict.
It has been suggested, however, that the success of one secessionist movement in Indonesia could, domino-like,
trigger more. This raises the issue of external support. The only country that has the capacity to support secession is
the U.S. To do this, the U.S. would require that its strategic and economic interests were best served by such
secession.
On his recent visit to Indonesia, Rumsfeld said that he would like to see renewed military aid to Indonesia's armed
forces, the TNI. This is despite a lack of meaningful reform of the TNI and indeed its reinvigorated political influence,
as well as the fading of an already dim prospect of trial for those responsible for the carnage in East Timor in 1999.
The reason for the support of the U.S. for the TNI is because the Bush administration has decided that, as a part of
its renewed focus on East Asia, the unity of Indonesia serves a greater strategic purpose.
Despite the superficial friendliness of the visit to Beijing by Powell and Rumsfeld, China is now seen by the U.S. as
the major strategic threat, not just to Asia but to the world. Russia, India, Japan, South Korea and Taiwan already
flank China, and Southeast Asia completes the circle.
There has long been a view in Southeast Asia that an economically enhanced China would, almost by definition,
throw its weight around in a region it has historically considered its "backyard". Hence the states of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations developed the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), as well as a less formal strategic coalition.
The lynchpin of ASEAN, and of a China-containment coalition, is Indonesia. And Indonesia has been a useless
strategic partner since 1997.
Within Indonesia, if Aceh and West Papua were successful in their bids for independence this would not necessarily
destroy the core of the state. However, as two of the biggest sources of state revenue, from oil and minerals
respectively, their loss would further damage Indonesia's still moribund economy.
Even more so than East Timor, their loss would send Indonesia's political elite into a rage, which despite all else has
remained committed to the idea of maintaining a united (and unitary) state. This sentiment remained strong under
the presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, and has been further enhanced by the election of Megawati Soekarnoputri.
Should another country support secession in particular in Aceh, Indonesia could be expected to call into question the
repayment of existing U.S.-backed loans from the International Monetary Fund and would bring the ARF undone. It
would also further limit the compromised use of the Straits of Malacca, and probably close the main Indian-Pacific
Ocean nuclear submarine passage of the Ombai-Wetar Straits in East Nusa Tenggara.
To this end, a united Indonesia with a mollified political elite all under the watchful eye of a re-armed TNI fits the
larger U.S. game plan much better. Australia's primary concern in this is securing the border between East and West
Timor, and this was no doubt part of Powell and Rumsfeld's trade-off with the TNI. Thus assured, Australia is further
strategically beholden to the U.S. As such, Australia is likely to become more conservative on the Aceh and West
Papua issues.
As with support for Soeharto's New Order during the Cold War such a political scenario will not resolve Indonesia's
many regional problems, but rather screw the repressive political lid back down again. In the greater strategic game,
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it seems, there remains a school of thought that believes repression is acceptable.
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